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ABSTRACT
Background
General practices in the UK contract with the
government to receive additional payments for high-
quality primary care. Little is known about the resulting
impact on population health.
Aim
To estimate the potential reduction in population
mortality from implementation of the pay-for-
performance contract in England.
Design of study
Cross-sectional and modelling study.
Setting
Primary care in England.
Method
Twenty-five clinical quality indicators in the contract
had controlled trial evidence of mortality benefit. This
was combined with condition prevalence, and the
differences in performance before and after contract
implementation, to estimate the potential mortality
reduction per indicator. Improvement was adjusted for
pre-existing trends where data were available.
Results
The 2004 contract potentially reduced mortality by 11
lives per 100 000 people (lower–upper estimates 7–16)
over 1 year, as performance improved from baseline to
the target for full incentive payment. If all eligible
patients were treated, over and above the target, 56
(29–81) lives per 100 000 might have been saved. For
the 2006 contract, mortality reduction was effectively
zero, because new baseline performance for a typical
practice had already exceeded the target performance
for full payment.
Conclusion
The contract may have delivered substantial health
gain, but potential health gain was limited by
performance targets for full payment being set lower
than typical baseline performance. Information on both
baseline performance and population health gain
should inform decisions about future selection of
indicators for pay-for-performance schemes, and the
level of performance at which full payment is triggered.
Keywords
physician incentive plans; primary health care; quality
indicators; quality of health care.
INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-performance programmes have become
increasingly important in the design and delivery of
health care for several countries including the US, UK,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Spain.1 In the UK, a pay-for-
performance contract was agreed between the
Department of Health and the British Medical
Association in 2003 and introduced into primary care in
April 2004,2 supported by an £8 billion ($12 billion)
investment by the Department of Health over the first
3 years.3 The contract rewarded performance against
criteria in four areas: clinical, organisational, patient
experience, and additional services. There were 10
clinical domains in the original contract, which was
revised to include a further nine domains in 2006.2,4
There were 76 clinical indicators in the 2004 contract,
increasing to 80 indicators in the 2006 revisions. Points
are allocated to each indicator, and a point represents
a payment of £124.60 ($190) for a typical practice.2 The
revisions to the contract in 2006 increased the points
allocated to clinical indicators from 550 to 665.4
Practices do not need to treat all patients that are
eligible, to receive full payment. In the 2004 contract,
target levels at which full payment for each indicator is
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received range from 50% for prescribing a beta-
blocker drug to a patient with heart disease (CHD 10),
to 90% for several smoking-related indicators. These
targets apply to the eligible population after exclusion
of all patients for whom the indicated treatment is
judged by their doctor to be inappropriate: the Quality
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) calls this concept
‘exception reporting’. This has been introduced to
allow practices to pursue the quality-improvement
agenda but not be penalised, where, for example,
patients do not attend for review, or where a
medication cannot be prescribed due to a
contraindication or side-effect. Appendix 1 gives the
full criteria agreed for exception reporting.2
There is a lack of consensus on decisions about
which indicators to include in pay-for-performance
programmes, whether to keep the same indicators in
or ‘rotate’ them out, and about the target performance
level that should be set for full payment to be received.
Identifying the best indicators and size of incentives is
important because incentives have been shown to
change practice, and areas of care not receiving
incentives may be relatively ignored.5 Clinical indicators
for the pay-for-performance contract in the UK were
selected, and the relative size of the financial incentive
determined, on the basis of clinical effectiveness and
anticipated workload.2 One problem with rewarding
workload is that clinical activity may be skewed
towards high-workload interventions that may be less
clinically effective than other interventions with a lower
workload. For example, indicator Asthma 6 — the
percentage of patients with asthma who have had an
asthma review in the last 15 months — is a high-effort
activity that received a maximum payment of 20 points
in 2004, although the QOF states that the evidence for
improvement in morbidity is ‘not good’. Conversely,
indicator Stroke 9 — aspirin therapy in patients after a
stroke — is a relatively low-effort intervention that has
a robust evidence base for health gain but only had a
maximum payment of 4 points. Payments may
therefore not reflect population health gain.6
An alternative method for selecting clinical indicators
is to estimate population health gain, as was first
proposed in 1992.7 Little is currently known about the
potential population mortality reduction from the pay-
for-performance contract in England, but this would
seem an important overall outcome of a clinical
contract. The aim of this study was to combine data on
baseline performance and clinical effectiveness and to
apply it to the English population to estimate the
reduction in all-cause mortality for individual indicators,
and for the contract overall, in order to understand
whether measures of health gain such as mortality
reduction should be used by policy makers to inform
the choice of new indicators to include in pay-for-
performance programmes, and to determine the size
of the financial incentives to maximise potential health
gain for the population.
METHOD
Calculations were made of the number of additional
eligible patients (all those on the relevant disease
register who were not excluded by exception reporting)
who would receive indicated treatment as a result of
performance improving from baseline, both to the
target set for full incentive payment, and over and
above the target to 100% performance.
Five types of data were used for this analysis: (1)
prevalence of each condition; (2) clinical effectiveness
of indicated care; (3) baseline performance; (4) level of
performance at which full target payment is gained; and
(5) maximum realistic (100%) performance (treating all
eligible patients who have not been excluded by
exception reporting). Baseline performance in the 2004
version of the pay-for-performance contract indicators
was obtained from four published studies for the year
before the contract was implemented (2003).5,8–10 Where
data were present in more than one study, the larger
study was used. For the two indicators in each contract
for which there were no baseline data, the conservative
assumption was made that the indicator was already
fully implemented. For baseline performance prior to
the 2006 revision of the pay-for-performance contract,
the English contract returns in 2005 were used, and for
new indicators, the QRESEARCH database in 2005
was used.9,11
Prevalence for each condition was obtained from the
pay-for-performance contract returns from all practices
in England in 2006 from the NHS Information Centre.11
To estimate performance, including maximum realistic
(100%) performance, only eligible patients were
considered, that is those not excluded by exception
reporting in the 2006 contract data.11 ‘Exception-
reported’ patients were deemed by their GP to be
unsuitable for that intervention, or did not agree to
investigation or treatment.2 Target thresholds that lead
to full financial incentive being gained were obtained
from the contract documentation for 2004 and 2006.2,4
The prevalence of smoking-related indicators was
adjusted to reflect predicted smoking-cessation rates
published by the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence.12
How this fits in
In the UK, a pay-for-performance contract was introduced into primary care in
April 2004; it was supported by an £8 billion investment by the Department of
Health over the first 3 years. The interventions in this contract have potential for
significant mortality reduction; however, this may be limited by pragmatic setting
of targets well below 100% of eligible patients. Using measures of health gain
(overall population outcomes) may be a better reflection of cost-effectiveness and
evidence base for the future development of pay-for-performance programmes.
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Clinical effectiveness was obtained from a literature
review that identified the highest level of evidence for
risk reduction in all-cause mortality for each clinical
indicator in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the pay-for-
performance contract.13 The study used a technique
previously described to estimate potential health gain
for each clinical indicator.14 These risk reductions were
converted to potential mortality reduction per 100 000
using the following three methods:
• absolute risk reduction was multiplied by the number
of cases per 100 000 population;
• relative risk reduction was multiplied by the control
event rate and the number of cases per 100 000
population; and
• control event rates were taken from the best
matched clinical trial identified in the literature
review.13
Odds ratios were converted to relative risk
reductions.
Sensitivity analyses
Estimates of aggregate potential health gain need to
allow for patients receiving multiple interventions for
one disease, and also for comorbidity. Where patients
receive multiple drug treatments for one condition, the
extra reduction in mortality from each additional drug in
one condition varies from zero to the sum of the
benefits of all the individual drugs.15 Comorbidity
means that the total number of people with any
condition is less than the sum of people with each
individual condition. For example, in the contract
conditions, the sum of the prevalences of the following
six chronic conditions: heart disease, stroke,
hypertension, diabetes, asthma, and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) is 29.3%,
whereas the prevalence of all of these conditions
combined is only 20.4%.11 These conditions include
most of the indicators with potential to save lives.
To allow for these two considerations, mid, higher,
and lower estimates of aggregate health gain were
constructed. For the main analysis (mid estimate), it
was assumed that health gain was additive between
different indicators and then the overall health gain was
reduced by a factor of 20.4/29.3 to adjust for
comorbidity. For the higher estimate, the assumption
was made that health gain was additive between
indicators, and the possible effects of comorbidity
were ignored. For the lower estimate, only the indicator
from each domain with the highest health gain was
used, and it was assumed that more than one
intervention in one disease will not further increase
health gain. The health gain was then reduced by a
further 20.4/29.3 to account for comorbidity. The health
gain from one of the diabetes indicators (DM 7) was
ignored throughout, as these patients are already
included within the diabetes indicator with better
glucose control (DM 6). A worked example for indicator
DM 18 is given in Appendix 2.
Also, there was evidence that clinical activities in
primary care were already improving in quality before
the 2004 contract. Data were available for the years
2003–2005 for three domains — asthma, diabetes, and
heart disease.8 These data show that care for asthma
improved by 14%, of which 2% was predicted by the
rate of improvement since 1998, for diabetes by 11%,
of which 3% was predicted by the trend, and for
coronary heart disease (CHD) by 9%, of which 4% was
predicted. In order not to overestimate the health gain
attributable to the contract, the estimates of health gain
were reduced for these conditions by the amount
predicted by the trend (that is, 2/14 in asthma, 3/11 in
diabetes, and 4/9 in CHD.
RESULTS
Evidence for reduced mortality was found for 25 of the
80 indicators in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the pay-
for-performance contract (Appendix 3). Prevalence,
risk reductions, control event rates, baseline activity,
exception reporting rates, and threshold targets are
displayed in Table 1. Mortality reduction for all included
indicators is shown in Table 2.
In the 2004 contract, the mid estimate was for an
additional 11 lives to be saved (lower–upper estimates
7–16) per 100 000 population per year when
performance improved from the pre-contract baseline
to the level of the targets set for full incentive payment.
This represents a saving of an additional 6600 lives in
the English population per year (lower–upper estimates
4200–9600). In the 2006 contract, additional mortality
reduction fell to zero for a typical practice, as baseline
performance had already exceeded the targets set for
full incentive payment. This decrease in potential lives
saved between 2004 and 2006 is due to substantial
improvement in baseline performance between 2003
and 2005 in all but two indicators — beta-blockers in
heart disease (CHD 10) and angiotensin-converting
enzyme (ACE) inhibitor treatment in diabetic kidney
disease (DM 15).
If all eligible patients were to receive treatment, over
and above the level set by the target for full payment,
then in the 2004 contract the mid estimate was for an
additional 56 lives to be saved (lower–upper estimates
29–81) per 100 000 population per year in England, as
performance improved from baseline to 100% of
eligible patients. In the 2006 contract, this fell to a mid
estimate of a potential additional 30 lives saved
(lower–upper estimates 20–43) per 100 000 population
per year. This equates to a possible saving of
approximately 18 000 additional lives per year in
England (lower–upper estimates 12 000–25 800).
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In terms of individual indicators, the clinical
indicators with the greatest potential for mortality
reduction if all eligible patients were to receive
treatment were primary prevention for hypertension
and influenza immunisation (12 and 6 lives respectively
in 2006). The domains with the largest potential
reduction in mortality were heart disease, diabetes,
and primary hypertension, which accounted for 4/5 of
the total reductions in 2006.
DISCUSSION
Summary of main findings
Between seven and 16 lives per 100 000 population
per year in England were potentially saved, with
performance improvement from baseline in 2003 up
to the target for full incentive payment. There was no
additional health gain in the 2006 version of the
contract, since on average the target for full incentive
payment had by then been achieved for all clinical
quality indicators. However, if performance in the
2006 contract rose to 100% (the maximum realistic
level at which all eligible — not exception-reported —
patients were treated), then this would potentially
save 30 lives per 100 000 population.
Strengths and limitations of the study
This study is the first to estimate English population
health gain in the pay-for-performance contract. Pre-
contract baseline performance is estimated across a
substantial proportion of the indicators in the contract
for the first time, derived from studies in English
practices in 2003. The clinical effectiveness of
indicators is derived from the highest quality evidence
available, usually controlled trials. Recent (2006–2007)
and reliable prevalence data from the contract were
used to estimate health gain,11 and an adjustment was
made for comorbidity.
The main limitation of the study is the difficulty in
attributing the changes in performance over time to the
intervention of the contract. The strongest method for
attributing causation is the randomised controlled trial,
but the contract was not introduced as a research
intervention. It was a rapidly introduced policy initiative,
so this research attempts to add to the observational
knowledge base about the possible past effects and
future suggested modifications to the contract. Trend
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Baseline Baseline Exception reporting, Target for Target for
Contract Prevalence/ Risk Control event rate, activity activity % (max full incentive full incentive
clinical indicatora 100 00011 reductions % annual mortality 2003, % 2005, % performance) payment 2004, % payment 2006, %
DM 18 3650 61 (RRR) 2.86 7010 7811 15 85 85
CHD 12 3530 61 (RRR) 2.86 7010 8111 13 85 90
BP 5 12 490 16 (RRR) 2.41 529 7211 4 70 70
CHD 10 3530 1.3 (ARR) 588 5211 27 50 60
Stroke 10 1610 61 (RRR) 2.86 7010 7711 15 85 85
DM 6 3650 36 (RRR) 2.02 459 5411 10 50 50
CKD 3 2380 1.1 (ARR) n/a 829 11 n/a 70
COPD 8 1430 61 (RRR) 2.86 7010 8211 13 85 85
CHD 9 3540 0.7 (ARR) 6810 9011 3 90 90
AF 3 1290 0.31 (OR) 5.68 n/a no data 4 n/a 90
CHD 8 3530 21 (RRR) 2.13 459 7011 9 60 70
Stroke 9 1050 1.5 (ARR) no data 8911 7 90 90
DM 12 1314 35 (RRR) 2.94 559 6911 7 55 60
LVD 3 390 0.31 (OR) 10.75 6110 8111 8 70 80
CHD 6 3540 0.32 (ARR) 679 8611 3 70 70
Smoking 2 4442 6 (RRR) 4.08 n/a no data 1 n/a 90
Asthma 5 980 30 (RRR) 3.00 6010 n/a 2 70 n/a
DM 7 3650 10 (RRR) 2.02 749 8611 5 85 90
BP 3 600 30 (RRR) 3.00 5310 n/a 1 90 n/a
DM 15 370 22 (RRR) 4.13 1008 8311 6 70 80
COPD 5 1287 19 (RRR) 1.08 6010 n/a 3 90 n/a
DM 4 166 36 (RRR) 4.08 6010 n/a 3 90 n/a
CHD 4 161 36 (RRR) 4.08 6010 n/a 3 70 n/a
CHD 11 410 0.37 (ARR) no data 8211 8 70 80
Stroke 4 73 36 (RRR) 4.08 6010 n/a 4 70 n/a
aAppendix 3 gives full names and definitions. ARR = absolute risk reduction. OR = odds ratio. RRR = relative risk reduction. n/a = not applicable.
Table 1. Data used to calculate estimates of mortality reduction for 2004 and 2006 indicators.
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data for the domains of asthma, diabetes, and CHD
suggest that performance in primary care was
improving before the contract began.8 If underlying
trends for quality improvement existed in more
domains, and if it is assumed that practices would have
continued their considerable efforts to maintain and
improve performance, then it is possible that much of
the health gain in the contract would have happened
anyway without the incentive scheme. The study
results allowed for the effects of trends where data
were available, but debate about the effect of any
underlying quality-improvement trends is less relevant
in the light of the study finding that the 2006 contract
was likely to have produced zero additional health gain
due to the higher baseline performance.
A second limitation is that the measure of health
gain used (mortality reduction per year) is narrow, and
is only available for 25 indicators. However, these 25
indicators are important in terms of health gain, and
are dependent on a further 18 structural and process
indicators in the clinical domains being met. The study
also searched for full published evidence for quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs), but this could only be
found for nine indicators. Third, while some estimates
for baseline performance were based on a large
database of over 3.5 million people, others were
based on smaller studies. Furthermore, baseline data
were not available for two indicators in each version of
the contract; although these indicators were
associated with relatively small health gains per
percentage point improvement, and so their exclusion
from the overall population health-gain estimates is
unlikely to affect the study conclusions. Fourth, the
study used evidence on performance for a typical
practice, and there will have been some practices with
baseline performance below the target for full
incentive in 2006 that had potential for health gain,
albeit small. Fifth, there is no agreed method for
aggregating estimates of mortality reduction in
patients with more than one coexisting treated
condition. This was dealt with by adjusting for
comorbidity, and by constructing upper and lower
estimates using different assumptions. Finally, the
prevalence data were taken from QOF returns from
each practice in England and these data are subject to
validation checks by the primary care trusts. However,
they may still include inaccuracies and may
overestimate or underestimate true prevalence, and
therefore health gain.
Comparisons with existing literature
Two studies prior to the introduction of the contract
evaluated the health-impact gain for a subset of eight
and five interventions respectively in primary care.6,16
The risk reductions in all-cause mortality were similar to
those found in the present study.
Implications for future research and clinical
practice
It may not be cost-effective to leave the same
indicators in a pay-for-performance scheme from year
to year as performance improves. Adding new
indicators while retiring older ones may lead to greater
health gain — although only of course if performance
is maintained in the old indicators — a hypothesis that
remains to be tested. Information on baseline
performance and health gain could be used to inform
e349
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Mortality reduction (lives per year)
Movement from baseline Movement from baseline to
performance to treatment target performance for
Contract of all eligible patients receiving full payment
clinical indicator 2004 2006 2004 2006
DM 18 7 3 1 0
CHD 12 6 2 1 0
BP 5 21 12 3 0
CHD 10 4 6 0 0
Stroke 10 4 2 1 0
DM 6/20 9 7 0 0
CKD 3 n/a 2 n/a 0
COPD 8 4 1 1 0
CHD 9 4 1 3 0
AF 3 n/a no data n/a no data
CHD 8 4 2 1 0
Stroke 9/12 no data 1 no data 0
DM 12 4 2 0 0
LVD 3 4 1 0 0
CHD 6 2 1 0 0
Smoking 2 n/a no data n/a no data
Asthma 5 3 n/a 1 n/a
DM 7 1 1 0 0
BP 3 2 n/a 2 n/a
DM 15 0 0 0 0
COPD 5 1 n/a 1 n/a
DM 4 1 n/a 1 n/a
CHD 4 1 n/a 0 n/a
CHD 11 no data 0 no data 0
Stroke 4 0 n/a 0 n/a
Total health gain 82 44 16 0
Adjustment for 81 43 16 0
double countingb
(upper estimate)
Adjustment for 56 30 11 0
comorbidityc
(mid estimate)
Lower estimate 29 20 7 0
Figures are rounded to the nearest whole number. aAppendix 3 gives full names and
definitions. bAdjustment for double counting in the diabetes indicators. cAdjustment for
comorbidity, reduction of 20.4/29.3. n/a = not applicable.
Table 2. Potential reduction in mortality for a population of
100 000 people from implementation of the 2004 and 2006
contract indicators, (1) all eligible patients (2) when target
thresholds are attained.
decisions about retiring less-effective indicators, and
weighting the size of financial incentives in order to
maximise potential health gain for the population.
Targets for full payment may need to be revised
upwards over time as performance improves — and
arguably could simply be set at 100% as long as
appropriate procedures for exception reporting are in
place.
The methods used to estimate potential reduction in
mortality from implementation of the pay-for-
performance contract could be extended to other
clinical interventions, and used to identify new clinical
indicators. As an example, an electronic search of the
British Medical Association’s ‘Clinical Evidence’
database was conducted, to identify indicators with
evidence for mortality reduction that could be used in
the primary care setting.17 Six interventions were
identified: a Mediterranean diet for secondary
prevention of heart disease (RRR [relative risk
reduction] 44%),18 beta-blockers for heart failure (RRR
38%),19 smoking cessation in primary prevention (RRR
30%),20 oily fish diet for secondary prevention of heart
disease (RRR 26%),21 spironolactone for heart failure
(RRR 24%),22 and cardiac rehabilitation (odds ratio [OR]
0.80).23 Further research could use broader measures
of health gain such as QALYs. This method could also
apply to other areas of care that have the potential to
reduce high morbidity and mortality, such as early
diagnosis of cancer. According to one study, improving
performance in earlier cancer diagnosis could save up
to 15 000 lives a year in the UK.24
The pay-for-performance scheme in primary care
had substantial potential for mortality reduction,
although this was limited by much good-quality care
giving a high baseline performance, and by some
targets being set below current baseline performance
for most practices. The focus on workload may have
been right at the time, in the context of a pay award for
GPs that was also intended as an investment in
practice infrastucture.2 As the framework evolves, it
would be sensible to consider using measures of
health gain for selecting indicators, as this would bring
the principles of cost-effectiveness and evidence-
based policy making more directly into the future
development of pay-for-performance programmes.
Funding body
This paper expands on data originally published in a report
commissioned and funded by the Policy Research
Programme in the Department of Health, to which all authors
contributed. The views expressed in the original report are not




The authors’ work for this paper was independent of the
Department of Health. Richard Cookson and Nicholas Steel sit
on National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
advisory committees.
British Journal of General Practice, September 2010
R Fleetcroft, S Parekh-Bhurke, A Howe, et al
e350
Discuss this article
Contribute and read comments about this article on the
Discussion Forum: http://www.rcgp.org.uk/bjgp-discuss
REFERENCES
1. Gravelle H, Sutton M,MaA.Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance
contract: further evidence from the Quality and Outcomes Framework.
http://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHE
%20Research%20Paper%2034.pdf (accessed 26 Jul 2010).
2. Department of Health. Investing in practice: the new GMS contract.
London: Department of Health, 2003.
3. Roland M. Linking physicians’ pay to the quality of care — a major
experiment in the United Kingdom.NEngl J Med 2004; 51(14):
1448–1454.
4. Hakin B.Revisions to the GMS contract 2006/07. London/Leeds: NHS
Employers, 2006.
5. Steel N,Maisey S, Clark A, et al. Quality of clinical primary care and
targeted incentive payments: an observational study.Br J Gen Pract 2007;
57(539): 449–454.
6. Fleetcroft R, Cookson R.Do the incentive payments in the new NHS
contract for primary care reflect likely population health gains? J Health
Serv Res Policy 2006; 11(1): 27–31.
7. Siu AL,McGlynn EA,Morgenstern H, et al. Choosing quality of care
measures based on the expected impact of improved care on health.
Health Serv Res 1992; 27(5): 619–650.
8. Campbell S, Reeves D,Kontopantelis E, et al. Quality of primary care in
England with the introduction of pay for performance.NEngl J Med 2007;
357(2): 181–190.
9. University of Nottingham.QRESEARCH specialises in research and analysis
using primary care electronic health data.Nottingham: University of
Nottingham, 2007.
10. Fleetcroft R, Cookson R. The relationship between prescribing expenditure
and quality in primary care: an observational study.Br J Gen Pract 2006;
56(529): 613–619.
11. NHS Information Centre. http://www.ic.nhs.uk/ (accessed 26 Jul 2010).
12. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence.NICE Guidance.
http://guidance.nice.org.uk (accessed 26 Jul 2010).
13. Fleetcroft R, Parekh S, Steel N, et al. Joint executive summary: potential
population health gain of the quality and Outcomes Framework. Report to
the Department of Health.York: Centre for Health Economics, 2008.
14. McColl A, Roderick P,Gabbay J, et al. Performance indicators for primary
care groups: an evidence based approach.BMJ 1998; 317(7169):
1354–1360.
15. Hippisley-Cox J, Coupland C. Effect of combinations of drugs on all cause
mortality in patients with ischaemic heart disease: nested case-control
analysis.BMJ 2005; 330(7499): 1059–1063.
16. McElduff P, Lyratzopoulos G, Edwards R, et al.Will changes in primary
care improve health outcomes? Modelling the impact of financial
incentives introduced to improve the quality of care in the UK.Qual Saf
Health Care 2004; 13(3): 191–197.
17. BMJ Publishing Limited.Clinical evidence.
http://clinicalevidence.bmj.com/ceweb/index.jsp (accessed 26 Jul 2010).
18. de Lorgeril M, Salen P,Martin JL, et al.Mediterranean diet, traditional risk
factors, and the rate of cardiovascular complications after myocardial
infarction: final report of the Lyon Diet Heart Study.Circulation 1999;
99(6): 779–785.
19. Brophy JM, Joseph L, Rouleau JL. Beta-blockers in congestive heart failure:
a Bayesian meta-analysis.Ann InternMed 2001; 134(7):550–560.
20. Doll R, Peto R,Wheatley K, et al.Mortality in relation to smoking: 40
years’ observations on male British doctors.BMJ 1994; 309(6959):
901–911.
21. Burr ML, Fehily AM,Gilbert JF, et al. Effects of changes in fat, fish, and
fibre intakes on death and myocardial reinfarction: Diet And Reinfarction
Trial (DART). Lancet 1989; 2(8666): 757–761
22. Pitt B, Zannad F, RemmeWJ, et al, for the RandomizedAldactone
Evaluation Study Investigators. The effects of spironolactone on morbidity
and mortality in patients with severe heart failure.NEngl J Med 1999;
341(10): 709–717.
23. Taylor RS, BrownA, Ebrahim S, et al. Exercise-based rehabilitation for
patients with coronary heart disease: systematic review and meta-analysis
of randomized controlled trials.Am JMed 2004; 116(10): 682–692.




researchers (accessed 26 Jul 2010).
British Journal of General Practice, September 2010 e351
Original Papers
The following criteria have been agreed for exception reporting:2
A. Patients who have been recorded as refusing to attend review who have been invited on at least
3 occasions during the preceding 12 months
B. Particular circumstances, for example, terminal illness, extreme frailty
C. Patients newly diagnosed within the practice or who have recently registered with the practice, who should
have measurements made within 3 months and delivery of clinical standards within 9 months; for example,
blood pressure or cholesterol measurements within target levels
D. Patients who are on maximum tolerated doses of medication whose levels remain suboptimal
E. Patients for whom prescribing a medication is not clinically appropriate, for example, those who have an
allergy or another contraindication, or have experienced an adverse reaction
F. Where a patient has not tolerated medication
G. Where a patient does not agree to investigation or treatment (informed dissent), and this has been recorded
in their medical records
H. Where the patient has a supervening condition which makes treatment of their condition inappropriate, for
example cholesterol reduction where the patient has liver disease
I. Where an investigative service or secondary care service is unavailable
Appendix 1. Criteria for exception reporting.
Indicator DM 18 about influenza immunisation in diabetes in 2004 is used here as a worked example to
demonstrate how potential mortality reduction was calculated.
The potential number of lives that could be saved per year in a population of 100 000 is a product of the
prevalence of diabetes in that population (3650), the relative risk reduction in mortality from influenza
immunisation (61%) and mortality in the unimmunised population (2.86%). This calculation is 3650 × 0.61 ×
0.0286 = 63.7 lives per 100 000.
However, the potential health gain from baseline is only a fraction of this raw estimate, because baseline
performance (immunisation) was 70%, and 15% of patients were exception reported. The maximum realistic
percentage of all patients is thus 85% (100% of eligible patients after excluding the 15% exception
reported), and the maximum potential gain in performance is 15% (the ceiling of 85% minus baseline
performance of 70%). So the maximum potential health gain from baseline to ceiling performance is 9.55
lives per 100 000, that is, 15% of the raw estimate of 63.7 lives per 100 000. To adjust for trends for
improved performance that was already happening, this figure is multiplied by 8/11, that is, 6.94 lives saved.
The potential health gain from baseline to target performance is even smaller, since target performance is
set at 85% of the maximum possible percentage of eligible patients (also 85%), which gives an effective
target of 72% of the total population (0.85 × 0.85). With baseline performance at 70%, the potential health
gain is 2% × 63.7 = 1.27 lives per 100 000 population. This figure was reduced by 3/11 to reflect the trend
in improvement that was already occurring, resulting in a potential health gain of 0.93 lives per 100 000
population.
Appendix 2. Worked example of calculating health gain.
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Indicator Full description
DM 18 The percentage of patients with diabetes who have had influenza immunisation in the preceding 1 September to 31 March
CHD 12 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease who have a record of influenza immunisation in the preceding
1 September to 31 March
BP 5 The percentage of patients with hypertension in whom the last blood pressure (measured in the last 9 months) is ≤150/90 mmHg
CHD 10 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease who are currently treated with a beta-blocker (unless a contraindication
or side-effects are recorded)
Stroke 10 The percentage of patients with TIA [transient ischaemic attack] or stroke who have had influenza immunisation in the preceding
1 September to 31 March
DM 6 The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last HbA1C is ≤7.4 (or equivalent test/reference range depending
on local laboratory) in last 15 months
CKD 3 The percentage of patients on the CKD [chronic kidney disease] register in whom the last blood pressure reading, measured in
the previous 15 months, is ≤140/85 mmHg
COPD 8 The percentage of patients with COPD who have had influenza immunisation in the preceding 1 September to 31 March
CHD 9 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease with a record in the last 15 months that aspirin, an alternative
antiplatelet therapy, or an anticoagulant is being taken (unless a contraindication or side-effects are recorded)
AF3 The percentage of patients with atrial fibrillation who are currently treated with anticoagulant drug therapy or an antiplatelet
therapy.
CHD 8 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease whose last measured total cholesterol (measured in last 15 months) is
≤5 mmol/l
Stroke 9/12 The percentage of patients with a stroke shown to be non-haemorrhagic, or a history of TIA, who have a record that aspirin,
an alternative antiplatelet therapy, or an anticoagulant is being taken (unless a contraindication or side-effects are recorded)
DM 12 The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last blood pressure is ≤145/85 mmHg
LVD 3 The percentage of patients with a diagnosis of CHD and left ventricular dysfunction who are currently treated with ACE
inhibitors (or A2 [angiotensin 2] antagonists)
CHD 6 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured in the last
15 months) is ≤150/90 mmHg
Smoking 2 The percentage of patients with any or any combination of the following conditions: CHD, stroke or TIA, hypertension, diabetes,
COPD, or asthma who smoke, whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation advice or referral to a specialist service,
where available has been offered within the previous 15 months.
Asthma 5 The percentage of patients with asthma who smoke, and whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation advice or
referral to a specialist service, if available, has been offered within the last 15 months
DM 7 The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last HbA1C is ≤10 (or equivalent test/reference range depending
on local laboratory) in last 15 months
BP 3 The percentage of patients with hypertension who smoke, whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation advice or
referral to a specialist service, if available, has been offered at least once
DM 15 The percentage of patients with diabetes with proteinuria or micro-albuminuria who are treated with ACE inhibitors (or A2
antagonists)
COPD 5 The percentage of patients with COPD who smoke, whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation advice or referral to
a specialist service, if available, has been offered in the past 15 months
DM 4 The percentage of patients with diabetes who smoke and whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation advice or
referral to a specialist service, where available, has been offered in the last 15 months
CHD 4 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease who smoke, whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation
advice or referral to a specialist service, where available, has been offered within the last 15 months
CHD 11 The percentage of patients with a history of myocardial infarction (diagnosed after 1 April 2003) who are currently treated with
an ACE inhibitor
Stroke 4 The percentage of patients with a history of TIA or stroke who smoke and whose notes contain a record that smoking-cessation
advice or referral to a specialist service, if available, has been offered in the last 15 months
Appendix 3. Full description of indicators.
